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1. Introduction 
This chapter examines the different ways megacities manage water by comparing how Los 
Angeles and New York - two U.S. metropolises that divert water from distant sources - have 
worked with their surrounding regions to acquire, allocate, and manage public supplies. 
Early in their histories these cities, in their quest to acquire water, adopted a hegemonic 
relationship with their neighbors. In effect, they sought to control regional sources that 
could satisfy current as well as projected water needs (Hundley, 2001; New York City, 2011; 
Koeppel, 2000; 2001). Over time, and under external pressure, both cities embraced 
collaboration with adjacent communities to address water supply and quality issues whose 
scope and impact required regional accommodation and sharing of authority. What they 
have done to achieve accommodation in light of water stress, and how they have done it, 
may afford lessons for megacities across the globe that face comparable challenges.  
New York and Los Angeles diverged in their motives for and methods of collaboration, in 
part because their water challenges differ. New York’s central challenge currently revolves 
around managing water quality and the safety of its drinking water. Meeting this challenge 
is virtually impossible without cooperation with non-governmental actors in other political 
jurisdictions from whence its water supply comes - and who would be severely burdened 
financially if the city had to build a large regional water filtration plant. For Los Angeles, by 
contrast, water (and air) quality issues in the Owens Valley - the source, since 1913, of one-
third of the city’s water - have driven efforts to partner with valley stakeholders to negotiate 
gradual reductions in flow and restoration of the watershed. While both cities were initially 
concerned with water supply, however, over time they both became increasingly worried 
over water quality and the need for integrated approaches to managing supply and quality. 
2. Method and approach 
Our approach is four-fold. We: 1) analyze the hydrological and political factors influencing 
water decisions; 2) compare these cities’ water policy histories; 3) examine their current 
collaborative challenges; and, 4) draw out their most important similarities and their lessons 
for other cities. For Los Angeles, we focus chiefly upon the Owens River with briefer 
discussion of newer (i.e., mid 20th Century) issues, including the State Water Project which 
diverts water from the Sacramento-San Joaquin - Bay Delta, and the Colorado River  
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Aqueduct, completed in 1940. While the Owens Valley case revolves around a powerful, 
growing city initially diverting water from a modest agrarian region in order to support 
future growth, and then restoring a portion of that region’s water under federal order, the 
latter cases revolve around endangered species protection and climate variability, 
respectively, as factors that compel change in urban water policy.  
For New York City, the chief focus of our discussion is the Croton and Catskill watersheds - 
the former is the city’s original regional water source, dating to the 1840s, while the second 
was developed in the late 19th Century. In more recent years, both watersheds have been 
part of the so-called New York City Watershed Protection Plan designed to protect the city’s 
water supply from sewage and runoff-induced contamination through adopting cooperative 
land use controls and other measures. These watersheds are the source of fully one-half of 
the city’s water supply. Additional case material from the Delaware River, an interstate 
stream which New York relies upon for the other half of its water supply, is also discussed.  
Section 3 sets the stage for comparison by first considering two vital questions: 1) how do 
megacities affect water supply and quality in their nested regions; and, 2) why are Los 
Angeles and New York good cases for studying these issues? Despite being located in a 
highly-developed society, and perceived as having safe, well-managed water systems, this 
was not always the case. Beyond this, as we shall see, Los Angeles and New York share 
important challenges with regards to infrastructure, the need to conserve water, and climate 
change which may translate into lessons for other megacities facing similar problems. 
3. Policy context – Megacities and water 
A number of accounts suggest that global freshwater supplies are increasingly facing severe 
stress: a growing imbalance between available supplies within various regions on one hand, 
and demands on those supplies by multiple users on the other. Water stress is generally 
attributed to population growth, climate variability (including extreme drought), and 
inadequately maintained and/or deteriorating water supply and treatment infrastructure. 
Experts view stress as caused by demographic, climatological, and socio-economic factors 
intersecting in various ways (World Meteorological Organization, 1997; World Resources 
Institute, 1998; Alcamo, et. al., 2003; World Water Council, 2005).  
While these three factors are compelling sources of stress, a more nuanced cause is rapid 
urbanization, exemplified by the phenomenal growth of so-called “megacities” composed of 
tens-of-millions of people. Megacities are a sprouting phenomenon in developing nations, 
especially, where cities and towns already comprise some 80% of the planet’s urban 
populace. More than two-thirds of the world’s urban residents live in cities in Africa, Asia, 
and Latin America. Moreover, since 1950, the urban population of these regions has grown 
five-fold, while in Africa and Asia alone, urban population is expected to double by 2030 
(Satterthwaite, 2000; UNPF, 2007).  
Large cities generally, and megacities in particular, contribute to water stress in two ways: 1) 
they are often located some distance from the water sources needed to maintain their 
growth; thus they must divert water from outlying rural areas which, in turn, often produce 
the food and fiber to support them; and, 2) soaring birthrates and in-migration (the latter 
often from these same outlying areas) place extra burdens upon water infrastructure, and 
generate severe health and hygiene problems. Both of these contributors underscore the 
complex ways demography, economics and climate factors interact. 
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Urban-related water stressors can be more precisely de-constructed as three-fold problems. 
First, large cities generate huge volumes of wastewater which are costly to treat and, if left 
untreated, can contaminate local wells and streams. Second, the spatial “footprint” caused by 
sprawling horizontal urban development and annexation imposes numerous water-related 
problems, including paving of city streets and commercial districts (contributing to 
pollutant runoff and diminished groundwater recharge), and consumption of water for 
parks and outdoor residential use (increasing evapo-transpiration and taxing local supplies).  
Third, while greater concentration of people in cities may lower unit costs for many forms of 
water infrastructure (Satterthwaite, 2000) the need to expand water supply and treatment 
networks over vast distances increases the likelihood of distribution system leaks and other 
failures. All these problems have been observed in a number of Third World megacities, and 
underscore how urbanization exacerbates climate change impacts on scarce water supplies; 
imposes extraordinary pressures on surrounding regions; and, outraces infrastructural 
capacity (UN, 2009: 32; Adekalu, et. al., 2002; Downs, Mazari-Hiriart, Dominguez-Mora, & 
Suffet, 2000; Gandy, 2008; Tortajada and Casteian, 2003; Yusuf, 2007; and Zérah, 2008).  
3.1 Hydrology and Geography as prologue – A Los Angeles and New York overview 
So, what can the experiences of Los Angeles and New York teach us about water stress and 
large cities? Conventional wisdom might suggest that being located in highly-developed 
societies both are far better in managing water supply and quality than their counterparts in 
less-developed nations. In reality, however, their longer-standing experience as large urban 
conurbations makes them instructive cases for other megacities. This is so for three reasons.  
First, early in their histories, both cities faced many of the same challenges to public health 
and wastewater management that their Third World counterparts face today. These 
challenges included confronting the role foul and unhealthful water plays in the spread of 
infectious disease (a particular problem for New York City which, in 1832, suffered a severe 
cholera epidemic attributed to contaminated drinking water, Koeppel, 2000, 2001; American 
Museum of Natural History, 2011). Another includes the need to take decisive, yet 
adaptable, action to upgrade public works in order to provide residents with abundant 
water, and determining whether satisfying the need for safe, secure, and dependable 
supplies was best left to the “efficiencies” provided by private sector investment, or better 
suited to management by governmental entities. Los Angeles and New York confronted this 
latter challenge early in their histories, as we will see (Glaeser, 2011: 99; Mulholland, 2002). 
To a large extent both challenges drove these cities to divert water from outlying regions.  
Second, in diverting water from outlying hinterlands, Los Angeles and New York generated 
well-documented, but vastly different, environmental and social impacts upon these 
adjacent regions. In the case of Los Angeles, diversion of water imposed reductions of both 
in-stream flow and groundwater in Owens Valley. These reductions, in turn, degraded local 
fisheries and wildlife habitat (McQuilkin, 2011), while acquisition of adjacent lands 
overlying aquifers deprived Owens Valley communities of the ability to pursue real estate 
development for commercial and residential use (VanderBrug, 2009).  
For its part, by acquiring much of the open space surrounding its reservoirs in the Catskill 
and Croton watersheds, a positive economic outcome generated by New York City was 
retention of low-density residential development that preserved the region’s rural character 
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(Westchester County Department of Planning, 2009). Later, sewage plant outfalls and non-
point pollution around these same reservoirs released contaminants into the city’s water 
supply which generated further, less popular land acquisition measures to avert pollution 
through eminent domain and condemnation suits - a strategy that continued through the 
early 1990s (New York State Department of Environmental Conservation, 2010a, 2010b). 
Finally, although these cities have very different hydrological features, New York and Los 
Angeles share two remarkably similar water problems. First, both cities have experienced an 
outracing of available supply as a result of locally-generated demands. Second, while the 
former is located in a wet and humid region, while the other is dry and semi-arid, both cities 
have needed to look outside their political boundaries for additional supply. They have also 
employed similar strategies to acquire water and land rights to ensure control over the 
watersheds from whence their water comes. By their wide range of conditions, we might 
suggest that these cities bound the impacts faced by most of the world’s large urban centers. 
That both cities share these problems in common underscores an important point about 
water stress: the traditional distinction between arid and semiarid regions on the one hand 
and more humid areas on the other, as a means of maintaining that arid regions’ water 
problems mostly revolved around inadequate water quantity while humid areas’ problems 
are water quality related, is not a valid claim. Water scarcity can occur in any urbanized 
region if demands cannot be attenuated (Feldman, 2009). 
Los Angeles is located in a flat, triangular-shaped semi-arid basin bounded on its north and 
east by mountains and on the west by the Pacific. Its Mediterranean climate experiences 
some 39.54 cm (15.58“) of average annual precipitation, all in the form of rain, which is 
collected by two major streams that rise in the San Gabriel portion of the Transverse Range 
dividing Southern from central California - the Los Angeles and San Gabriel Rivers. The Los 
Angeles River was the city’s major source of water for nearly a century, providing drinking 
water and serving as the irrigation source for local vineyards and orange groves - both 
through an elaborate system of ditches and channels called zanjas (Gumprecht, 2001: 3; Los 
Angeles Department of Water and Power, 2010b).  
New York City, by contrast is located on the Atlantic Coastal Plain in a slender portion of 
land bounded by the outfall of the Hudson and East Rivers, and referred to as the Atlantic 
slope drainage. The humid continental climate, fed by the Gulf of Mexico and Atlantic 
weather systems, produces some 127 cm (50”) of precipitation per year, some 63.5 - 76.2 cm 
(25 - 30”) of which falls as snow. In its initial period of settlement, local water supplies were 
provided through ponds, streams, and springs located on the island of Manhattan 
(American Museum of Natural History, 2011; New York State Department of Environmental 
Conservation, 2010b). These hydrological differences help explain how both cities initially 
managed water supply, while their phenomenal demographic growth helps us understand 
the remarkably similar path both took in seeking hegemony over regional supplies. Table 1 
depicts major features of the water supply systems of New York and Los Angeles. 
4. Comparing policy history – The evolution of regional dominion 
While Los Angeles and New York developed along different trajectories, especially early on 
(i.e., New York grew at a faster rate much earlier), in regards to water supply they followed 
two strikingly comparable patterns of development. First, both sought to fully exploit 
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locally-available resources through collective effort. Second, when these sources proved 
insufficient to support further growth, they acquired more distant sources. Acquisition of 
these sources was predicated on concerns with water security, safety, and plentifulness.  
 
Water supply characteristic Los Angeles New York 
Major supply sources LA Aqueduct/E. Sierra = 18%*
Metropolitan WD = 71% 
Groundwater = 10% 
Recycled wastewater = 1% 
Croton Watershed = 10% 
Catskill watershed = 40% 
Delaware watershed = 50% 
Distance from source to city Owens Valley = 376 km  
(233 miles) 
Mono Lake = 544 km  
(338 miles)  
Croton Reservoir = 201 km 
(125 miles) 
Number of storage facilities 114 (reservoirs and tanks) 19 (reservoirs) 
Water supplied/day 1998.7 million liters (528 
million gallons approx.) 
3792.9 million liters  
(1.2 billion gallons approx.) 
Customers 9 million 4.1 million 
Metered water rates1 $2.92 - 5.19/hundred feet3  $3.17/hundred feet3 
*In recent years, the LA Aqueduct from Owens Valley has supplied upwards of 35% of the city’s water 
supply. However, mandated restoration of Mono and Owens Lakes has resulted in a reduction of 
supply of approximately half that annual delivery. 
1 New York charges a flat water rate while Los Angeles has a “tiered” or increasing block rate system 
wherein customers are charged a lower “base” if they stay within a designated conservation allotment. 
If they exceed that allotment (typically 79,287 liters or 2800 cubic feet/month), they are charged at the 
higher rate (Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (2009b).  
Table 1. Water Supply Systems of Los Angeles and New York City 
In the event, there is one major way their quest for regional dominion differed: Los Angeles 
sought external sources of supply mostly because its regional access to water was always 
precarious. After its first full century of settlement (c. 1880) the city suddenly aspired to 
grow, but found that its semi- arid region simply had few ground or surface water supplies 
available nearby. By contrast, New York was impelled toward the Croton Watershed in 
Westchester County, some 64.4 km (40 miles) to its north, by the poor quality and 
inadequate volume of its local supplies. A cholera epidemic in 1832, caused in part by 
degraded water quality and poor waste disposal, drove efforts to build a Croton Aqueduct. 
Declining well levels, which made fire fighting capacity inadequate, was also a factor 
(Koeppel, 2000: 6). Each city‘s respective quest for regional dominion reveals these intricate 
patterns.  
4.1 Los Angeles – Early water development 
From its founding in 1781, and for nearly a century afterwards, the Los Angeles River was 
the city‘s major water source. The first families who founded and settled the “pueblo” 
almost immediately set about constructing a brush “toma” or dam across the river, diverting 
water into a so-called “Zanja Madre,” or mother ditch, which fed homes and irrigation 
canals into fields that, at first, were closely adjacent to the plaza - the civic center of the early 
settlement (Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (2010b).  
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This cooperative effort to develop and manage local water supplies was animated by two 
principal, and somewhat contradictory, goals. First, harvesting of the river was necessary to 
accommodate a population sufficient to allow the young pueblo to serve, within its nexus in 
hispanic colonial culture, as a trading center for neighboring ranchos and missions 
(Hundley, 2001). In effect, the young pueblo was a “service“ community for a regional 
economy. Second, the pueblo needed to secure rights to water from regional competitors in 
order to protect its modestly growing population and its own agricultural and commercial 
activities - including trade with local native American tribes.  
What made these goals somewhat contradictory was the fact that within a few short years 
after its founding, interdependence with the Gabrielino community, which served as a labor 
source for the city’s own agricultural and commercial activities, threatened the authority of 
nearby missions and ranchos (Estrada, 2008). In effect, the Los Angeles River supported the 
small-scale agricultural and domestic needs of the pueblo, while the pueblo itself functioned 
as a commercial center for regional farming, ranching, and artisanal manufacturing.  
In addition to developing an extensive system of locally-managed and maintained zanjas, to 
secure its local water rights, city officials sought and obtained ratification of a so-called 
“Pueblo” water right: an entitlement under traditional Spanish law to lay claim to all needed 
waters in the vicinity. This virtual ownership of water in the Los Angeles River was granted 
in perpetuity by King Carlos III of Spain in 1781 (Los Angeles Department of Water and 
Power, 2010b). However, various legal manevers were exercised during the 19th century - 
under Mexican and later U.S. rule - to ensure that this Pueblo water right was legally 
perfected. By the time the City of Los Angeles was incorporated in 1850 under the state’s 
first constitution, following California’s admission as the 35th state, the city of 1,600 was 
vested with all of the rights to the water of the river (Hundley, 2001).  
Four years later (1854) the zanjas system became encapsulated into a city department which, 
within a few years, was leased to a private company and became the Los Angeles City 
Water Company. This company was purchased by the city in 1902 for some $2 million in 
order to facilitate municipal control of the system, and to help facilitate the financial 
arrangement needed to build an aqueduct. Privatization of the water system of Los Angeles 
was largely a reaction to the high costs of maintaining and repairing the zanjas which, by the 
late 19th Century, had grown to encompass not merely ditches and channels but an 
arrangement of water wheels to lift the water to gravity flow irrigation systems, along with 
some 300 miles of water mains, reservoirs, infiltration galleries and pumping facilities. 
4.2 New York – Early water development 
While unofficially founded as a Dutch trading post in 1624, and centered for decades on 
Manhattan Island, early New York - like early Los Angeles - relied on domestic water 
supplies obtainable from sources in the immediate vicinity. Initially, these consisted of 
shallow, privately-owned wells. Under Dutch rule – a period of about forty years, sanitation 
and water quality were decidedly poor: accumulations of human and animal waste were 
common, contaminated runoff into holding ponds was frequent, and there was no concerted 
effort to regulate harmful activities impinging on locally-adjacent well-users (Koeppel, 
2001). Thus, New York’s initial efforts to develop a water supply system were largely 
animated by three concerns: accommodating population growth, averting communicable 
disease, and achieving both objectives while saving money (Glaeser, 2011; 99). 
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Under English rule (1664 and after), improvements were only marginal. Foul, standing 
water was common, and outbreaks of epidemics stemming from poor water quality - 
including yellow fever and cholera – were not unknown (Koeppel, 2001). In 1677 the first 
general public-use well was dug near the fort at Bowling Green, while the first city reservoir 
was constructed on the east side of Broadway between Pearl and White Streets in 1776 - 
about the time the city’s population grew to over 20,000 residents. Initially, water pumped 
from wells near the Collect Pond, east of the reservoir, was distributed through hollow logs 
laid along main thoroughfares in Manhattan (New York City, 2011).  
As the city’s population grew, pollution of wells became a serious problem, as did periodic 
supply shortages due to drought. These tribulations led to more concerted efforts to 
supplement local supplies through cisterns and springs in upper Manhattan (an area less 
developed at this time). Following the outbreak of a Yellow Fever epidemic in the last 
decade of the 18th Century (1798), New York (along with Philadelphia, one of the country’s 
largest cities), sought to provide a safer, more secure, and disease free water supply.  
In 1800 the Manhattan Company (forerunner of Chase Manhattan Bank) sank a well at 
Reade and Centre Streets, pumped water into a reservoir on Chambers Street and 
distributed it through wooden mains to a portion of the community. This venture became, 
in effect, the city’s first quasi-public water utility and was a major enhancement to the 
earlier Collect Pond (Willensky and White, 1988: 18). In 1830, in an effort to enhance 
emergency supplies, the city built a tank for fire protection at 13th and Broadway which was 
replenished from a well. Water was distributed through 30.48 cm (12-inch) cast iron pipes.  
As in Los Angeles, these advanced efforts to provide a safe and secure supply were largely 
privately funded and managed (Koeppel, 2000). Led, ironically, by two New York statesmen 
who soon became mortal enemies - Aaron Burr and Alexander Hamilton - the city’s 
Common Council was persuaded to obtain state legislative endorsement of the Manhattan 
Company’s charter. Burr and Hamilton had different motives in advocating the charter and 
the company: the former sought financial profit through transforming the “surplus” 
revenues of the firm to his own design, while the latter was swayed by the desire to un-
burden city residents of a tax-supported public system (Glaeser, 2011: 99).  
In any case, the result - as in Los Angeles - was to acquire sufficient revenue to enlarge and 
expand the water supply infrastructure of the city. Moreover, in both cities the motive of 
water security eventually led them to expand greater public control in order to construct 
massive aqueduct systems: a feat begun by New York in the 1840s and by Los Angeles in 
the early 1900s. 
4.3 Public works and urban triumphalism – The aqueduct age in both cities 
After weighing various alternatives for additional water supply Los Angeles and New York 
expropriated distant sources. The contentious history of Los Angeles’ efforts to acquire the 
Owens Valley, in contrast to those of New York in its Croton and Catskill watersheds, has 
been well documented (Walton, 1992; Davis, 1993; Mulholland, 2002). In a later section we 
will discuss why reactions differed. At this juncture, the important point is that neither city 
pursued much consultation with regional decision-makers in undertaking these efforts.  
After exploring various options for increasing supply to keep up with growing demands, 
New York officials sought to impound water from the Croton River, in today‘s Westchester  
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County, and to build an aqueduct to carry water from what became known as the “Old“ 
Croton Reservoir to the City. In contrast to Los Angeles, the urgency of an aqueduct was not 
as readily apparent to many local residents, and initial political support was far from 
unanimous. According to one writer, a major fire in 1835 which consumed a sizeable portion 
of what is now lower Manhattan, convinced many wavering citizens of the need for an 
aqueduct (Koeppel, 2001). Moreover, even after the aqueduct was completed – in 1842 – not 
all city water users chose to connect themselves to the system, preferring to rely upon less 
reliable, but still cheaper, local supplies from wells and cisterns (Koeppel, 2000).  
New York city’s original aqueduct, known today as the Old Croton Aqueduct, had an initial 
capacity of about 90 million gallons per day and was placed into service in 1842. 
Distribution reservoirs were first located in Manhattan at 42nd Street (discontinued in 1890 - 
at the site where the present-day New York Public Library is located) and in Central Park, 
south of 86th Street (discontinued in 1925). Newer reservoirs were subsequently constructed 
to increase supply: Boyds Corner in 1873 and Middle Branch in 1878 (New York City, 2011). 
In 1883, as the city’s continued growth and commercialization taxed this supply source, a 
commission was formed to build a second aqueduct from the Croton watershed together 
with additional storage reservoirs. This conduit, known as the New Croton Aqueduct, was 
built between 1885-1893 and first placed in service in 1890, while still under construction. 
One of the biggest land use issues was the need to acquire land and right-of-way for the 
New Croton Dam and Aqueduct System – an effort begun in 1880 when seven thousand 
acres were acquired to harness the Croton River's three branches, while a twenty square 
mile area was needed by the city on which to build the New Croton Dam. Twenty-one 
dwellings and barns, one and a half dozen stores, churches, schools, grist mills, flour mills, 
saw mills, four towns, and over four hundred farms were condemned and taken over to 
build the dam – and some 1500 bodies were removed from six cemeteries and relocated 
along with their stones and fences. One local historical account states that “protests, lawsuits 
and some confusion preceded payment of claims“ (Village of Croton, 2010). 
At the same time, the present municipal system was consolidated from the various water 
systems in the communities now consisting of the Boroughs of Manhattan, the Bronx, 
Brooklyn, Queens and Staten Island. An important parallel with Los Angeles, here, is how 
water system consolidation became an important first step toward municipal annexation. For 
Los Angeles, completion of the first Owens Valley Aqueduct in 1913 leveraged the city’s 
ability to force smaller communities coveting water (e.g., Hollywood) to accede to 
annexation as a condition for becoming connected to the distribution system. 
A third phase development occurred after the turn of the century. In 1905, a Board of Water 
Supply established by the New York State Legislature cooperated with the city in 
developing the Catskill region as an additional water source – with the former planning and 
constructing facilities to impound Esopus Creek, and to deliver the water to the city via the 
Ashokan Reservoir and Catskill Aqueduct. This project was completed in 1915. It was 
subsequently turned over to the City's Department of Water Supply, Gas and Electricity for 
operation and maintenance. The remaining development of the Catskill System, involving 
the construction of the Schoharie Reservoir and Shandaken Tunnel, was completed in 1928. 
A fourth and final effort to acquire water was the effort to allocate the Delaware River. In 
1927 the Board of Water Supply submitted a plan to the state Board of Estimate and 
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Apportionment for the development of the upper portion of the Rondout watershed and 
tributaries of the Delaware within New York State. This project was approved in 1928. Work 
was subsequently delayed by an action brought by the State of New Jersey in the U.S. 
Supreme Court to enjoin the City and State of New York from using the waters of any 
Delaware River tributary (New York City, 2011). This case underscores the regional 
animosity brought about by the City’s effort to seek water hegemony.  
In May 1931 the Supreme Court upheld the City’s right to augment its water supply from 
the Delaware‘s headwaters. However, a second Supreme Court ruling, in 1954, was required 
to adjudicate riparian allocation of the Delaware between New York, New Jersey, and 
Pennsylvania (Derthick, 1974: 48, 54). Construction of the Delaware System was begun in 
March 1937 and entered service in stages: the Delaware Aqueduct was completed in 1944, 
Rondout Reservoir in 1950, Neversink Reservoir in 1954, Pepacton Reservoir in 1955 and 
Cannonsville Reservoir in 1964. Figure 1 depicts the current New York water supply system. 
Los Angeles took much longer, but followed a similar path in its efforts to build a major 
supply conduit from the Owens Valley. As the city's population rapidly grew after 1880, it 
became apparent that the Los Angeles River was simply was not large enough to support 
the city’s transformation into a large metropolis. Its population doubled during the 1890s, 
from 50,000 to 100,000, and more than doubled again within five years (to over 250,000), all 
but depleting local groundwater. Moreover, the city’s incorporated area doubled between 
1890 and 1900 as many basin communities embraced annexation to ensure water supply. 
Fred Eaton, one-time city engineer during the 1890s, mayor from 1899-1901, and 
superintendent of Los Angeles‘ municipal water system conceived of an Owens River 
aqueduct in the early 1900s (Davis, 1993: 5-9). Initial challenges proved to be fiscal, not 
logistical. The city - which had long sought to rationalize management and maintenance of 
the zanjas system – succeeded, under Eaton, in persuading voters to acquire public 
ownership of the vast, fragmented, and poorly maintained private network of water 
providers in 1902. Following consolidation of legal control over water in its immediate 
vicinity, the Owens Valley project was pursued.  
After an unusually harsh drought in the summer of 1904, William Mulholland – a protégé of 
Eaton and now city engineer – asked his mentor to “show me this water supply” in the 
Owens Valley about which Eaton had often spoke. Following an intrepid journey both took 
through the region, which included a preliminary survey of an aqueduct route, events 
moved quickly. In September 1905, voters approved by a 10-1 margin a $1.5 million project 
to acquire right-of-way, and to build an aqueduct that would stretch from north of 
Independence some 376 km (234 miles) southeast to the San Fernando Valley – a recently 
incorporated area of the city.  
At precisely the moment political forces in Los Angeles maneuvered to acquire Owens 
Valley water rights, the newly-formed U.S. Reclamation Service drafted a plan to irrigate the 
Owens Valley by constructing one or more dams in the vicinity of Long Valley. As a federal 
agency mandated to promote irrigation, the Service was inclined to support the people of 
the valley against those of a large city seeking to augment its water supply. However, the 
Reclamation Service’s southwestern regional chief, Joseph P. Lippincott served (secretly) as 
a paid consultant to Los Angeles – abetting the city’s plans, since Lippincott advocated for 
the city’s interests in Washington, DC, not those of the Owens Valley. Lippincott also helped 
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ensure that, while valley lands would be set aside for public purpose, no land rights would 
be secured: an action that abetted Eaton’s efforts to set about buying up options on lands for 
aqueduct construction (Kahrl, 1982).  
Within two years, two other efforts were completed in the city’s favor: a successful 
campaign to obtain Congressional approval of the City’s application to build the aqueduct  
 
 
Fig. 1. New York City’s Water Supply System 
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was effectuated in June 1906; while in 1907, Los Angeles voters approved a second bond 
measure authorizing $23 million for aqueduct construction. Construction began in 1908 and 
the project was completed in November 1913.  
Like New York City, the Owens Valley was one phase in the city’s water supply expansion. 
By the early 1920s, the Board of Public Service commissioners (the overseers of the Los 
Angeles Department of Water and Power or LADWP), became aware that the city would 
exceed the Owens Valley’s supply by 1940 (thus, a second aqueduct was built in the Owens 
Valley all the way to Mono Lake - a project approved by voters in 1930 and completed in 
1940).  
A third phase was symbolized by the efforts of Mulholland to acquire water from the 
Colorado River. A four-year series of surveys began in 1923 to find an alignment that would 
bring the water of the Colorado River to Los Angeles. In 1925 the Department of Water and 
Power (LADWP) was established, and the voters of Los Angeles approved a $2 million bond 
issue to perform the engineering for the Colorado River Aqueduct. While the six-
cooperating states of the basin sought a means to allocate the Colorado’s flow - an effort that 
began with the 1922 Colorado River Compact and required Congressional passage of the 
Boulder Canyon Dam Act in 1928 - Los Angeles proactively sought to move events forward.  
Needing allies in Washington, and help from neighboring Southern California cities who 
also coveted this water, in 1928 the city and LADWP got the state legislature to create the 
Metropolitan Water District of Southern California or MWD (Fogelman, 1993: 101-3; Erie, 
2006). In 1931, voters approved a $220 million bond issue for construction, and work began 
on the ten-year 300 mile long project which now supplies 60% of Los Angeles, Orange, 
Ventura, San Bernardino, Riverside, and San Diego Counties‘water. In the 1970s the regional 
cooperative also began importing water from Northern California via the State Water 
Project and the California Aqueduct. Figure 2 depicts Los Angeles‘ water system. 
4.4 Post-aqueduct policies – Collaboration with external regions 
Subsequent to completion of their respective aqueduct systems, both cities began to face a 
series of water-related environmental quality challenges which, unlike the efforts to initially 
acquire water, required unprecedented levels of regional collaboration to resolve. In Los 
Angeles‘ case, this collaboration emerged after a series of litigious actions resulting from 
adverse ecological and tribal-equity issues. In New York, they came about through harsh 
economic realities brought to the fore by a severe federal regulatory challenge.  
As far back as 1913, the virtual draining of Owens Lake as a result of the opening of the first 
Los Angeles Aqueduct exposed the alkali lake bed to winds that lofted toxic dust clouds 
containing selenium, cadmium, arsenic and other elements throughout the region. Airborne 
particulates were often suspended for days during excessively dry periods – and have long 
posed a health hazard to local residents. They have even posed risks to communities further 
to the South. In the 1970s, the siphoning off of additional flows following completion of a 
second and larger aqueduct worsened the problem – igniting further protest.  
These environmental impacts to Owens Lake - and to other, smaller watersheds within 
the Owens Basin (e.g., Lee Vining, Walker, and Parker Creeks) - dovetailed with concerns 
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regarding water management in Los Angeles itself, beginning in the 1970s. Continuing 
drought and unrelenting population growth compelled the city to embrace a more 
adaptive approach to water management reliant on conservation, drought management, 
and a balance between augmenting supplies while providing incentives to lower 
demands: a method termed integrated resource management. This approach came to rely on 
non-structural, incentive-based, and education-driven methods to reduce water use and 
has been facilitated in part by concerns over climate change as well as the stresses and 
strains felt throughout its water importing regions (Los Angeles Department of Water and 
Power, 2010a).  
 
 
Fig. 2. City of Los Angeles’ Water Supply System 
These issues came to a head in the 1990s through public protest, litigation, and federal 
intervention. In 1994, a settlement was reached between Los Angeles, Inyo and Mono 
Counties, and the U.S. EPA, and was enforced - in part - through a series of massive fines 
levied upon the LADWP. The settlement forced the agency to restore 62 miles of the lower 
Owens River, to “re-water” portions of Owens Lake and to allow the return of flows 
through Owens Gorge, and to restock bluegill, largemouth bass, fingerling trout, and other 
aquatic species.  
Over time, native fauna are expected to return in significant numbers. In exchange, LADWP 
will receive 18,503 fewer cubic meters (15,000 fewer acre-feet) of Owens Valley water each 
www.intechopen.com
 
Cities and Water – Dilemmas of Collaboration in Los Angeles and New York City 
 
331 
year - reducing Los Angeles‘ reliance on the Owens Valley from some 35% of its total 
imported supply to approximately 18-20% (Linder, 2006; Hundley, 2001). As important as 
these changes in policy outcome may prove to be, of at least equal if not greater significance 
is the change in decision-making process by which they are being implemented. A 
Collaborative Aqueduct Modernization and Management Plan, or CAMMP, led by LADWP, 
the California Department of Fish and Game, and two environmental groups - California 
Trout and the Mono Lake Committee - has been undertaken to determine the means by 
which aqueduct operations can best be modified to facilitate changes in streamflowthat can 
satisfy environmental restoration needs on the one hand, while continuing to provide water 
to Los Angeles. Thus far, extensive data gathering, analysis, and drafting of prescriptions 
have been conducted, and the effort has entailed far more coperation among protagonists 
than in the past (McQuilkin, 2011). 
While these environmental resotration activities involve consultation among intervenor 
groups, elected decisionmakers, and regulators, another collaborative effort has been 
conducted, off-and-on, regarding Native American water rights in the Owens Valley. 
Several Paiute Indian tribes lost their land and water rights in the region following white 
settlement in the mid-19th Century - and well-before the aqueduct was built. A partial 
restoration of water rights occurred in 1908 following a pivotal Supreme Court case – 
Winters vs. U.S. - which “explicitly affirmed water rights on Indian Reservations” by, in 
effect, setting aside correlative water rights on these reserved lands (Burton, 1991).  
An Owens Valley Indian Water Commission – comprised of representatives of the Bishop, 
Big Pine, and Lone Pine Paiute tribes – are negotiating with LADWP to ensure they receive 
the water they are entitled to. While a final settlement has yet to be reached, when 
completed it will set relations regarding water use between Los Angeles and its surrounding 
region on another new footing (Owens Valley Indian Water Commission, 2009). 
One of the notable benefits of New York’s acquisition of much of the Catskill and Croton 
watersheds during the 19th Century was the opportunity to, in effect, ensure a virtually 
pristine source-water strategy. The storage reservoirs built by the city are surrounded by 
hardwood and evergreen forests that naturally filter water and retard erosion, thus averting 
sedimentation that would otherwise reduce drinking water quality. This asset also saves 
New York City billions of dollars in water treatment costs, according to the World Bank; has 
averted water-borne diseases; and, facilitates New York’s distinction as the nation’s largest 
city without a drinking water treatment plant (American Planning Association, 2011).  
In the 1970s, water quality in these watersheds began to deteriorate as a result of 
contamination from sewage outfalls, leaky residential septic systems, agricultural runoff, 
and land cleared for residential development. The most significant issues that arose were: 1) 
sediment problems or turbidity within the Catskill Watershed, which can transport 
pathogens and interfere with the effectiveness of water filtration and disinfection; and, 2) 
excess nutrients, particularly phosphorus. The former can generate algae blooms that cause 
serious odor, taste and color issues, while excess phosphorus can cause eutrophic water 
conditions and increase carbon. Moreover, this water, mixed with chlorine, can result in the 
formation of “disinfection byproducts“suspected of being carcinogenic (New York State 
Department of Environment and Conservation, 2010b). 
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After years of study, environmental protection officials in New York City – and state 
officials representing the Department of Environmental Conservation – concluded that there 
were two feasible options to forestall threats of federal intervention, by EPA, to institute 
more strenuous remedial measures. The first was to build an artificial filtration plant, the 
city’s first, at an estimated cost of between $8-10 billion, with an annual operating expense 
in the vicinity of some $360 million. The second option was to restore the Catskill/Croton 
watersheds through a combination of land purchases, compensation of existing private 
property owners for growth restrictions (e.g., conservation easements), and subsidies for 
septic system and other improvements. The city chose this much less-expensive option (at a 
total cost of approximately $200 million) – paid for through the sale of municipal bonds 
(NewYork State Department of Environment and Conservation, 2010b). 
The second option - now known as the New York City Watershed Protection Plan, has been 
effective in complying with federal drinking water standards and delaying the need for a 
filtration plant. It is based on explicit, legally binding agreements – a Filtration Avoidance 
Determination (FAD) agreement, and a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), concluded in 
January 1997 between several federal, state, New York county and city agencies, as well as 
various educational and non-profit organizations and watershed coalitions to provide 
regulatory oversight, perform environmental monitoring, protect water quality, educate the 
public, communicate about issues pertaining to pollution and watershed stewardship, and 
provide funding and other assistance to watershed communities (Westchester County 
Department of Planning, 2009: 2-26). 
This partnership acknowledges the common interest of both public and private entities - in 
the city and within the two watersheds - in abating pollution through working together, 
especially given the limited power of any single entity to abate non-point pollution. Unlike 
the Los Angeles case, where collaboration on environmental quality issues initially 
emanated from an adversarial clash of interests, this partnership came about more amicably, 
while its composition has been similarly diverse. Members include New York City agencies, 
upstate communities in the twin watersheds, the U.S. EPA and other federal agencies, the 
New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) other state agencies, and 
various environmental groups.  
One explanation for this comparatively amicable partnership is political realism: most 
watershed communities would have been adversely affected had New York City been 
forced to build a drinking water filtration system. This is so for two reasons: 1) the plant 
would have been paid for by all water users (and, in all likelihood, by regional taxpayers); 
and, 2) the state - if not the City itself as eminent domain tenant - would have been forced to 
impose more onerous land-use controls over the watershed if a partnership had not been 
formed. In effect, the indirect threat of having to pay for a water filtration plant was exactly 
the incentive needed to collaborate. Moreover, the choice of a multi-party partnership best 
suited the goals of all protagonists. It offered a viable, effective solution at manageable cost 
and through largely voluntary action (Croton Watershed Clean Water Coalition, 2009). 
However, given continued growth in rural areas throughout the region, and continued 
problems with turbidity, it has been necessary to revisit this plan.  
In 2004, the city began construction of a $2 billion underground filtration plan in Van 
Cortlandt Park, Bronx designed to filter water from the Croton system, which is scheduled 
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to be completed in 2012. It has also continued to acquire sensitive lands in the Catskills/ 
Delaware watersheds to further buffer their reservoirs from contamination, and thus, to 
remain in compliance with the state/EPA approved FAD agreement (New York City 
Department of Environmental Protection, 2010). 
In sum, for both Los Angeles and New York City, local collaboration was abetted to some 
degree by federal and state government action. For the former, EPA intervention forced Los 
Angeles to rectify the condition of Owens Lake (and thus, indirectly, also improve the 
condition of other valley watersheds affected by adverse flows). Ironically, violation of the 
Clean Air Act (not the Clean Water Act) forced the city to work with state agencies, local 
valley officials and intervenor groups. For New York City, it was the threat of EPA (and state 
regulatory) intervention under the Safe Drinking Water Act (the Croton and Catskills are, 
after all, potable water sources) which compelled the city and its neighbors to collaborate to 
avert further sewage and non-point runoff contamination of the region’s reservoirs.  
5. Conclusion  
Two fundamental questions are prompted by our discussion of Los Angeles‘ and New York 
City‘s diversion of water from their surrounding regions. The first is: why the absence of 
overt political conflict in the latter case as compared with the former? The second (as earlier 
noted) is: what can other megacities learn from these cities‘experiences?  
Taking the first of these questions – the attenuation of conflict in New York, and its intensity 
in Los Angeles, it is important to parse the question somewhat. An often assumed difference 
in the two cases is socio-economic: the Croton and Catskill watersheds are closer to New 
York City than the Owens Valley is to Los Angeles, and far better integrated into the 
former’s economy. In the present-era, for example, evidence of the strong integration of the 
Croton Watershed’s economy with that of New York City’s five boroughs is offered by 
commuter traffic patterns - some 17,000 Croton Watershed workers commute from New 
York City daily - nearly 40% of the region’s workforce, while some 18,000 workers living in 
the watershed commute to the city daily (about 35% of the workforce - see Westchester 
County Department of Planning, 2009: 2-27, 8).  
However, this explanation is a bit trickier than might at first appear. New York and Los 
Angeles share profound socio-economic contrasts with their importing watersheds, which 
remain highly rural in character. While this is obvious with regards to the Owens Valley - a 
rural region initially dependent on farming and ranching before Los Angeles diverted its 
water - it is just as true for the Croton and Catskill watersheds. When initially settled, the 
upper Croton watershed, for example, was a remote and economically self-reliant region. Its 
residents developed separate and distinct ways of life initially dependent on dairy and crop 
farming (Westchester County Department of Planning, 2009: 2-26). Only in the late 19th 
Century, after completion of the aqueduct system, did the region’s economy become more 
closely integrated with that of New York City.  
A better explanation for the seeming absence of inter-regional conflict in the Croton and 
Catskill watersheds is the fact that New York’s efforts to develop the water resources of 
these basins were, by comparison with those of Los Angeles in the Owens Valley, far more 
transparent and politically above-board. There is no evidence that the former sought to buy 
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up watershed lands in secret, or to secure both surface and groundwater rights exclusively 
for its own use (and with federal government help). By comparison, the well-documented 
resistance to Los Angeles‘ activities in the Owens Valley, evidenced in part by the militancy 
of opposition, including acts of sabotage against the aqueduct during the 1920s, and tacit 
complicity in these acts displayed by many valley residents, dramatize the deep resentments 
generated by Los Angeles’ actions. Many Owens Valley residents believed they had become 
a virtual colony of Los Angeles (Walton, 1992: chapter 5).  
Their animosity was strengthened by what they believed was national-level collusion in the 
city’s actions. President Theodore Roosevelt personally interceded in the Owens Valley case, 
persuaded that the future growth of Los Angeles was more important than the interests of 
Valley settlers. He not only ordered the eastward extension of the Sierra National Forest to 
discourage additional homesteading, thus ensuring protection of the aqueduct’s right-of-
way, but he further stated that the interests of Los Angeles exemplified “. . . the greatest 
benefit of the greatest number and for the best building up of this section of the country” 
(Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, 2010b). 
Given all this, one must remain cautious about putting too fine a point on these differences. 
Opposition to New York City’s efforts in the Croton Watershed, while infrequently 
reported, nevertheless existed. As early as 1837, some Westchester County residents 
lamented the implications of a Croton Aqueduct on their welfare. As one writer stated: ”If 
the rivers of Westchester County are to be taken from it, how is it to rise in arts, 
manufacturing, and farming” (Quoted in Koeppel, 2001: 8)? Clearly, some residents 
acknowledged the long-term economic implications of diverting water. 
There are two other reasons to avoid drawing too radical a contrast between New York and 
Los Angeles with regards to inter-basin conflicts. First, both cities have experienced intense 
interstate water conflicts, in both cases entailing Supreme Court litigation. And eventual 
water apportionment. Conflict between California and Arizona, spurred mostly by Los 
Angeles‘ utilization of the Colorado River as a major source of water after 1940, led to the 
important case of Arizona v. California (1964) by which the court reduced the amount of 
Colorado River water available to California, and further ruled that lower basin states (e.g., 
Arizona) were entitled to reasonable uses of tributary flows (U.S. Department of the Interior, 
2008). Similarly, conflict between New York, Delaware and Pennsylvania led to two U.S. 
Supreme Court decisions allocating water among protagonists. Initially, the court upheld 
New York City’s right, as an upstream riparian, to use a portion of the Delaware watershed. 
In a later case, the Court acknowledged the rights of all three states to an equitable 
apportionment of the Delaware River (Derthick, 1974). Environmental concerns under the 
Endangered Species Act have likewise prompted federal courts to reduce water deliveries 
from the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta in recent years (Erie, 2006).  
A second reason for caution is that both cities have experienced intense political conflict 
over the respective roles of private, market-driven water development efforts on the one 
hand and advocates for public control on the other. As noted in section 4, while both cities’ 
preoccupation with water security led them to seek expanded public control of their local 
water systems to permit construction of massive aqueduct systems, originally, things began 
quite differently. In their early civic histories, both Los Angeles and New York viewed 
private water provision as the most desirable way to achieve water security. In fact, private 
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provision was the norm throughout much of the 19th century. Incorporated in 1799, New 
York’s Manhattan Company was inefficient and scandal-ridden. Yet, until 1834, it conspired 
with water cart owners to block the New York legislature’s creation of a board of water 
commissioners, which ultimately bought out the company and built the Old Croton 
Aqueduct (Erie, 2006: 174).  
Recall that Los Angeles, in 1902, acquired its private water company in part to amass the 
finances to build an Owens Valley Aqueduct. Even after acquiring its water company, 
however, Los Angeles never succeeded in eliminating the sway of private capital over 
water-supply. As is widely known, a syndicate of land investors sought to enrich 
themselves through the Los Angeles Aqueduct project by purchasing lands in the San 
Fernando Valley. Contrary to widespread belief, William Mulholland – the project’s 
principal engineer - did not share this syndicate's avaricious motives. He sought to free 
the city from dependence upon erratic water sources in order to permit orderly growth. 
While he only conveyed knowledge of plans to build an Owens Valley Aqueduct to the 
Board of Water Commissioners and a few local officials, he did so simply to avert a 
stampede of speculators into the valley that would cause land prices to skyrocket 
(Mulholland, 2002).  
5.1 Lessons for other megacities 
So, what can other megacities learn from the experiences of New York and Los Angeles in 
regards to collaboration on regional issues and impacts of water development? The basic 
answer to this question brings us back to where we started this chapter - the challenge of 
water stress. As we have seen, Los Angeles and New York historically experienced stress, 
took various actions to address it which impacted their hinterlands, and continue to reckon 
with it through efforts to conserve water, improve infrastructure, and plan for climate 
change. While neither city has “solved“ the problem of stress, their efforts to manage it 
harbor lessons for other megacities.  
Since the 1970s, Los Angeles‘ conservation efforts have principally revolved around 
metering, conservation pricing, low-flow water appliance mandates, and efforts to 
compensate low-income groups for the costs of installing the latter. Water use has been 
considerably reduced - average water demands in period 2004 - 2010 are comparable to 
those of 1980, even though some 1.1 million additional people now live in Los Angeles (Los 
Angeles Department of Water and Power, 2010a: 8).  
In 1988, New York City began metering to induce conservation and to ensure that larger 
volume water users pay their fair share. By the 1990s, water use declined some 28 percent as 
compared to 1979 (Shultz, 2007). Like Los Angeles, New York has also invested nearly $400 
million in a 6.0 liter (1.6-gallon) per-flush toilet rebate program, which reduced water 
demand and wastewater flow by 342.96 million liters (90.6 million gallons) per day, a seven-
percent reduction. One effect of this rebate program, aside from saving some $600 million, is 
delaying by about 20 years the need for water supply and wastewater-treatment expansion 
(U.S. EPA, 2010).  
From the standpoint of regional collaboration, these experiences hold important lessons for 
other megacities in one important respect: conservation efforts lessen impacts on outlying 
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communities - including the same communities from whence water supply originates. For 
Los Angeles, the more water that is conserved, the easier it becomes to reduce reliance upon 
both Owens Valley imports and those from other regions. For New York, similarly, the less 
water used, the less likely it is that stored water supplies will be depleted - thereby 
stretching available water andmaking less urgent the completion of various infrastructure 
improvements to deliver water to the city. Both cities are pursuing additional “active“ 
conservation measures - with Los Angeles emphasizing stormwater capture and wastewater 
reuse and New York focusing on drought management and distribution system leak 
detection (Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, 2010a; New York City Department 
of Environmental Protection, 1998). While New York will continue to rely on incremental 
improvements to achieve conservation goals - more metering and the like – it, too, is likely 
to experience the same economic pressures as Los Angeles. It is likely that other megacities 
will look to both cities for assessments of these innovations’ effectiveness. 
As for infrastructure, issues related to stress may be far more problematical. Both cities 
suffer from aging and deteriorating water distribution systems. New York City is rebuilding 
its aqueduct system - and is currently engaged in construction of “Tunnel n. 3“, an upgrade 
of the Croton aqueduct system, which loses millions of gallons annually. New components 
are also being added to its Delaware Aqueduct - all at a cost of some $2 billion. Los Angeles 
is rebuilding – piece-by-piece – its oldest distribution network components. However, the 
city faces a unique megacity challenge - continuing to deliver water in the event a major 
seismic eventruptures the Colorado and/or State Water Project Aqueducts. This is a major 
preoccupation for the Metropolitan Water District (MWD) which is the primary importing 
water agency for the region. While Los Angeles aspires to reduce reliance on MWD, during 
dry years it cannot do so. Moreover, it has made numerous investments in MWD projects 
under the assumption that it will continue to be a beneficiary of its supply (Los Angeles 
Department of Water and Power, 2010a). 
Finally, as regards climate change, both cities are devoting enormous efforts in embracing 
climate issues in water resource planning. In New York City’s case, sea-level rise threatens 
water infrastructure, especially for water treatment (Beller-Simms, et. al., 2008: 104-5). For 
Los Angeles, climate change threatens the robustness of already precarious imports - the 
aforementioned Metropolitan Water District, for example is already concerned that climate 
change will complicate its ability to engage in water trading schemes with rural, agricultural 
water users in the future (Erie, 2006). 
In conclusion, it is not far-fetched to suggest that the massive water diversion projects Los 
Angeles and New York have pursued have had a symbolic as well as practical significance. 
For Los Angeles, the Owens Valley Aqueduct, Colorado River and State Water Project 
Aqueducts, and Port of Los Angeles all became symbols of the city’s rise to eminence, and 
its ability to surmount the difficulties of being located in an insular region not readily 
blessed by a natural port or source of abundant freshwater. Similarly, for New York City, 
the Croton Aqueduct – the city’s oldest imported water project – became part of a tradition 
of “grand civic projects” that, in the 19th Century, included the Erie Canal, Brooklyn Bridge, 
and IRT subway - all of which made the city the greatest metropolis in North America 
(Hood, 1993: 92). A final lesson here is that all these projects were not just civic activities, but 
publically-funded ones financed through bond markets, reminding us that neither the 
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private nor public sectors alone can solve urban water problems - an important reminder in 
a political climate increasingly ambivalent about “privatizing” water supply. 
6. Nomenclature – Key terms 
CAMMP  Collaborative Aqueduct Modernization and Management Plan 
DEC   Department of Environmental Conservation (New York State) 
FAD   Filtration Avoidance Determination Agreement 
IRT   Interborough Rapid Transit (New York City’s original subway) 
LADWP   Los Angeles Department of Water and Power 
MOU   Memorandum of Understanding 
MWD   Metropolitan Water District (of Southern California) 
US EPA or EPA   United States Environmental Protection Agency  
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